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Let E be a separable linear topological space, which admits a complete metric 
compatible with the topology, and (Q, .d, 1) a complete probability space. Let 
> E .d 0 B(E) @B(E). Then > is coalition convex if and only if for almost all w, 
2 ,,, is convex. (‘1 1986 Academic Press, Inc. 
Let E be a linear topological space which admits a complete metric com- 
patible with the topology. Let (Q, d, p) be a complete probability space. 
Let g(E) be the Bore1 field on E. Let 2 be an at’Q.%?l(E)@~??Idl(E) 
measurable subset of G? x E x E. For each w E Q, regard the o-section of > , 
> ,w={(e,,e,)l(w,e,,e,)~ >-} as a relation on B,={e((w,e,e)~ >}. 
This model of individual preferences with a measurable space Q of 
individuals and E, the commodity space was initially described by Aumann 
[3]. For A E d and f and g measurable maps of A into E, f is said to 
dominate g on A (symbolized by f b A g) if and only iff(o) > w g(w) for p- 
almost all o E A. Thus, f > A g means the coalition A prefers the selection 
(or coalition A preference) f to the selection g.Vind [9] pursued the idea 
that coalitional preferences were central. This was followed by studies of 
Cornwall [4, 51 and Richter [8]. Debreu [6] showed that the coalitional 
preferences ofVind arose from individual preferences. Recently, Armstrong 
and Richter [ 1 ] have put Debreu’s work in a more general setting. They 
have shown that there is a l-l correspondence between properties of 
individual preferences and properties of coalitional preferences, at least in 
case E = W. In particular they demonstrated that almost every individual 
preference ismonotone if and only if for each A E d, the set of coalition A 
preferences is monotone. Similar assertions hold for transitivity, asym- 
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metry, and other properties. Since the fact that R” is locally compact is 
used in these arguments, whether similar statements hold in a more general 
infinite dimensional setting was left open. 
We say that the relation 2 is coalition convex provided that for each 
A E s$ and for each measurable map g: A -+ E such that for each o E A, 
g(w) E B,, the set D( g, A) is convex, where 
Armstrong raised the following question at the Institute for Mathematics 
and Its Applications inJanuary 1984 during the sessions concentrating on
mathematical economics and discusses it in his survey [2]: 
If > is coalition convex, then is it true that for almost all CO, Q ,” is convex? We 
recall that a relation < ,i) is convex means for each x E B,, { y 1 x < _ y} is a convex 
subset of E. 
We will give an affirmative answer to this question under the assumption 
that E is separable. The technique of proof can be used to settle the 
equivalence of possession, between individuals and coalitions, of a number 
of other properties. 
THEOREM. Let E be a separable linear topological space, which admits a 
complete metric compatible with the topology, and (Q, &‘, p) a complete 
probability space. Let > E d @ ~2#( E) 0 B(E). Then 2 is coalition convex if 
and only if for almost all co, 2 w is convex. 
Proof. Let 
r={(qe,,e,,e,,e,,cr)EQxExExExEx[O, 11: 
e, 2 we4, e2 3 oe4, ael + (1 - a)e2 = e3 
and e3 Swe4}. 
It can be checked ~E&@~(E)Q%?(E)@W(E)@W(E)@?~?([O, 11). Let 
S= z,(r). The claim of the theorem is that p(S) = 0. Let G = zQ x co.ll(T). 
We note that it follows from known theorems that SE d and G is p x i- 
measurable, where 1 is Lebesgue measure on [O, 11 [7, p. 441. Also, note 
that Z7,( G) = S. 
LEMMA . Zf w E: S, then 1(G,) > 0. 
Proof: Suppose w E S and A(G,) = 0. Choose e,, e,, e3, e4, and a such 
that 
(w, el, e2, e3, e4, a) Er. 
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This means 
el aoe4, e2 2 d4 
and 
ae, +(l -g)ez =e3 sC0e4. 
But, since A(G,) = 0, there are numbers fi, y, and r in [0, 1 ]\G, such that 
Now, 84 G, and, again, e, 2 oe4, e2 > we4. So, if /3e, + (1 - fl)e2 aoe4, 
then p would be in G,. Thus, 
e; =j?e, +(l -B)e2 awe4. 
Similarly, e;=ye, +(1-y)e,>,e,. 
Now,forthesamereason,re;+(l-z)e;~,e,.Butre;+(l-r)e;=e,. 
This is a contradiction. Therefore, if w E S, then n(I),) > 0. Since G is 
(p x I)-measurable, (px n)(G) = js A( G,) C+(W) > 0. On the other hand, by 
Fubini’s theorem, 
where G” = (01 (w, c() EG}. This means there is some a such that G” EJ~ 
and ,D( G”) > 0. 
Let A=G”. Let M=Tn(AxExExExEx {a}). Let q% be a map of A 
into ExExExEx(cr} which is a (C, 2?(E)@93(E)@3?(E)@ 
~(~)OW[O, 11))- measurable selection for M [7, p. 541. Thus, 4(w) = 
(fl(U)Y fi(W)I J-3(u), f4(~), a), f or each w in A, where the maps f;(o) are 
(2, a(E))-measurable. But, for each o E A, g(o) = f4(o) E B,. Also, fi and 
f2 are in D(g, A), but f, + (1 -a) f2 = f3 $ D( g, A). This contradiction 
establishes the theorem. 
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